Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy

Sunday, January 1st, 1995 at 12:00 am by Herbert Hovenkamp
Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1

This article attempts to identify the appropriate concerns of antitrust policy for joint ventures that engage in either member exclusion or product exclusion. Many exclusions are competitive and may even be essential to the success of the venture or to guaranteeing incentives to create similar ventures in the future. At the same time, however, we fear joint ventures because they may facilitate the exercise of market power, and successful acquisition or exercise of market power often requires some kind of exclusion. For example, if applications for membership are numerous, the cartel that admits all applicants will not be able to reduce marketwide output, which is essential to successful collusion.

Author Information

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, the University of Iowa