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	<title>Columbia Business Law Review</title>
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	<description>Columbia Business Law Review is the first legal periodical at a national law school to be devoted solely to the publication of articles focusing on the interaction of the legal profession and the business community.</description>
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		<title>Anti-Whistleblower Laws and Your Legislature: A Love Story</title>
		<link>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12732</link>
		<comments>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12732#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 11:40:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Fiona Finlay-Hunt</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CBLR Online]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Imagine that you are a worker on one of your state’s biggest egg farms. During the course of your employment, you have witnessed and documented, in photographs and video, hundreds of instances of callous abuse resulting in serious injury and even death to the animals. Many of the workers there deliberately injure the hens and the farm’s management is apathetic, as long as production stays up. Who is the criminal here? You are. At least, that is the case in [&#8230;] (<a href="http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12732">More&#160;&#8594;</a>)]]></description>
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		<title>Understanding the Cyprus Bank Bailout and the Uncertainty it Creates</title>
		<link>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12728</link>
		<comments>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12728#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 04:14:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Johanna Mayer</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CBLR Online]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[As part of the rippling effect of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, the Republic of Cyprus suffered from a severe decline in tourism and shipping—its two largest sources of revenue—leading to a 1.67% decrease in economic growth in 2009.  This led to high rates of unemployment, increased state debt to cover unemployment benefits, and ultimately a recession.  In the past four years, the economy in Cyprus has not only failed to regain its pre-2009 form, but has [&#8230;] (<a href="http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12728">More&#160;&#8594;</a>)]]></description>
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		<title>The Fight Over Dell: Growing Stigma Against Management Buyouts</title>
		<link>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12726</link>
		<comments>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12726#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 04:12:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Peter Wang</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CBLR Online]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The $24.4 billion dollar proposed buyout of Dell has raised a number of eyebrows since its announcement on February 5th. The proposal to take Dell private, led by its CEO and founder, Michael Dell, and the private-equity firm Silver Lake is notable as both the largest tech-related buyout ever as well as the largest proposed buyout since the financial crisis. In the months since the deal’s announcement, however, the proposal has attracted increasing opposition from some of Dell’s most prominent [&#8230;] (<a href="http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12726">More&#160;&#8594;</a>)]]></description>
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		<title>FTC v. Watson Pharma.: Toward a Solution for Pay-for-Delay Settlements</title>
		<link>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12723</link>
		<comments>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12723#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 04:06:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>David Byowitz</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CBLR Online]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[On Monday, March 25, 2013, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, where it will pass judgment on the validity of “reverse-payment settlements” (also known as “pay-for-delay” settlements) in the pharmaceutical industry. An opinion is expected by the close of the Court’s term this summer. The facts behind this case are typical of reverse-payment settlement cases. Solvay Pharmaceuticals acquired the marketing rights to the testosterone gel AndroGel, and was granted a patent for the [&#8230;] (<a href="http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12723">More&#160;&#8594;</a>)]]></description>
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		<title>What is Reasonable?:  A Look at the Lost Profits Doctrine and the Reasonable Certainty Standard</title>
		<link>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12715</link>
		<comments>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12715#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 20:26:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Raj Krishnan</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CBLR Online]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Judges fancy the term &#8220;reasonable.&#8221; Some even believe reasonable can have an objective component to it. Given its widespread acceptance, a person unfamiliar with the intricacies of the American legal system would sensibly conclude that the term reasonable has a quantifiable component. This belief is sadly mistaken. The facade of reasonableness is particularly abused in lost profits doctrine. All jurisdictions state that reasonable certainty is a basic requirement to prove lost profits, even if some courts further apply various extensions [&#8230;] (<a href="http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12715">More&#160;&#8594;</a>)]]></description>
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		<title>CBLR 2013.1 Complete!</title>
		<link>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12703</link>
		<comments>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12703#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 15:31:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Anne Coxe</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Announcements]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The Columbia Business Law Review is pleased to announce the completion of  Issue 2013.1. Please visit our Current Issue page for the issue’s contents and article abstracts. Ordering information for this and future issues is available on our Subscriptions page.]]></description>
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		<title>A Precedent Built On Sand: Norcon v. Niagara Mohawk</title>
		<link>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12699</link>
		<comments>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12699#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 15:19:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Houston Adair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[2013]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[CBLR In Print]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Victor P. Goldberg, A Precedent Built On Sand: Norcon v. Niagara Mohawk, 2013 Colum. Bus.L. Rev. 38. Under the common law, a contracting party could only demand assurance of performance if the other party was insolvent.  If a party had reasonable grounds for insecurity, the UCC Section 2-609 allowed it to demand adequate assurance even if the counterparty were solvent.  The Restatement (Second) adopted the same rule for non-goods.  In NorCon v. Niagara Mohawk the New York court extended the adequate [&#8230;] (<a href="http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12699">More&#160;&#8594;</a>)]]></description>
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		<title>Shadow Banking and Financial Distress: The Treatment of &#8220;Money-Claims&#8221; in Bankruptcy</title>
		<link>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12695</link>
		<comments>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12695#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 15:16:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Houston Adair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[2013]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[CBLR In Print]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Current Issue]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Chrystin Ondersma, Shadow Banking and Financial Distress: The Treatment of &#8220;Money-Claims&#8221; in Bankruptcy, 2013 Colum. Bus.L. Rev. 79. Despite the panic in the money market in 2008 that required a $3 trillion Treasury guarantee to stave off a full-fledged run on money market funds, Dodd-Frank did not shut down shadow banking, nor did it make shadow banking safe.  After Dodd-Frank, distressed financial institutions are subject to a number of conflicting legal regimes, one of which continues to be the Bankruptcy Code.  [&#8230;] (<a href="http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12695">More&#160;&#8594;</a>)]]></description>
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		<title>Introduction: The Institutional Dimensions of Antitrust Adjudication: Exploring the Bases of Judicial Decision Making in the United States and Europe</title>
		<link>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12690</link>
		<comments>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12690#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 15:11:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Houston Adair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[2013]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CBLR In Print]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Current Issue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Issue 1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lecture: The Institutional Dimensions of Antitrust Adjudication: Exploring the Bases of Judicial Decision Making in the United States and Europe]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[William H. Rooney, Introduction: The Institutional Dimensions of Antitrust Adjudication: Exploring the Bases of Judicial Decision Making in the United States and Europe, 2013 Colum. Bus.L. Rev.i.]]></description>
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		<title>Antitrust and the Judicial Virtues</title>
		<link>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12686</link>
		<comments>http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12686#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 15:09:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Houston Adair</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[2013]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CBLR In Print]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Current Issue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Issue 1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lecture: The Institutional Dimensions of Antitrust Adjudication: Exploring the Bases of Judicial Decision Making in the United States and Europe]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and the Judicial Virtues, 2013 Colum. Bus.L. Rev. 1. Although commentators frequently debate how judges should decide antitrust cases substantively, little attention has been paid to theories of judicial virtue in antitrust decision making.  This essay considers four pairings of virtues:  (1) striving for substantive purity versus conceding to institutional realism; (2) incrementalism versus generalism; (3) presenting a unified face versus candidly conceding differences among judges on an appellate panel; and (4) adhering strictly to stare decisis [&#8230;] (<a href="http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12686">More&#160;&#8594;</a>)]]></description>
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